The paper [Howard E. Brandt, "Conclusive eavesdropping in quantum key distribution," J. Opt. B: Quantum Semiclass. Opt. 7 (2005)] is generalized to include the full range of error rates for the projectively measured quantum cryptographic entangling probe, and also the full range of inconclusive rates for the entangling probe measured with the POVM receiver.
INTRODUCTION
A design was recently given for an optimized entangling probe attacking the BB84 (Bennett-Brassard 1984) protocol of quantum key distribution and yielding maximum Renyi information to the probe [1] , [2] . Probe photon polarization states become optimally entangled with the signal states on their way between the legitimate transmitter and receiver. Although standard von-Neumann projective measurements of the probe yield maximum information on the preprivacy amplified key, if instead the probe measurements are performed with a certain positive operator valued measure, then the measurement results are conclusive, at least some of the time [3] . It was assumed throughout that the error rate E induced by the probe in the legitimate signal was such that 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/4 for the projectively measured probe. Here we extend the analysis to cover the full range of theoretical interest, namely 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/3.
GENERALIZED ENTANGLING PROBE
In the present work a generalization is given to include the full range of error rates, 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/3, for the projectively measured quantum cryptographic entangling probe, and the full range of inconclusive rates, 0 ≤ R ? ≤ 1, for the entangling probe measured with the POVM receiver. To accomplish this, the following sign choices must be made for the probe parameter µ in Eqs. (26) and (27) of [1] :
in which we define
One also has the definition, Eq. (75) of [1] :
In this case, the probe states |A 1 , |A 2 , |α + , |α − , and |α of [3] become:
respectively, where |w 0 and |w 3 are the orthonormal basis states in the twodimensional Hilbert space of the probe. As in [1] , the upper sign choice in Eq.
(23) of [1] has been chosen. Note that Eqs. (5)- (9) are consistent with Eqs. (5)- (7) and (11)- (14) of [3] for 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/4, as must be the case. It then follows that Eqs. (1)- (4) of [3] , along with Eqs. (7)- (9) above, now apply for 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/3. (Note that E = 1/3 corresponds to complete information gain by the quantum cryptographic entangling probe.) Also the probe and measurement implementations remain the same (as in [1] , [2] , [3] ) with the initial state of the probe now given by Eq. (6) or (21) below. In obtaining the maximum Renyi information gain I R opt by the probe, Eq. (23) of [3] , from Eqs. (7) and (8) 
and one readily obtains for the overlap Q of correlated probe states:
Then substituting Eq. (4) in Eq. (11), one obtains
where we mean the positive square root; i.e.
On noting that
and substituting Eqs. (13) and (14) in Eq. (12), one obtains
Finally, substituting Eq. (15) in Eq. (10), one obtains Eq. (23) of [3] , namely,
for the full range of error rates, 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/3, as required. From Eq. (31) of [3] , one also concludes that the full range of inconclusive rates R ? apply, namely 0 ≤ R ? ≤ 1. In this regard, it is useful, for the implementation of the entangling probe incorporating the POVM receiver to measure the probe, to parameterize the states |A 1 and |A 2 , and η, and sgn(1 − 4E) above, along with Eqs. (29) and (33) of [3] , in terms of the inconclusive rate. Thus, using Eq. (31) of [3] , it follows that the parameter E is
Then the reflection coefficient R 1 in the POVM receiver, Eq. (29) of [3] , becomes
Also, substituting Eq. (17) in Eqs. (3)- (6) above, one obtains
Thus for the case of measurement of the probe with the POVM receiver, according to Eq. (17), E can be treated as a parameter ranging form 0 to 1/3, and determined by the set inconclusive rate R ? . Also, the reflection coefficient R 1 of the POVM receiver must be set according to Eq. (18), by the inconclusive rate. Finally, according to Eq. (21), the initial state |A 2 of the probe can be tuned to a set inconclusive rate of the POVM receiver. Finally, it is important to emphasize that, if the photon loss rate, due to attenuation in the key distribution channel between the probe and the legitimate receiver, equals the inconclusive rate R ? , and only the conclusive states are relayed by the probe to the legitimate receiver, then the entangling probe together with the POVM receiver can obtain complete information on the preprivacy-amplified key, once the polarization bases are announced in the public channel during reconciliation [3] . Also, to counter alteration in the attenuation due to the probe, the legitimate channel may be replaced by a more transparent one. One may therefore conclude that the BB84 protocol [5] has a vulnerability very similar to the well-known vulnerability of the B92 (Bennett 1992) protocol [6] , [3] , [7] . It is also possible that the popular Ekert protocol [8] has a similar vulnerability. It is important to emphasize that, because for the present implementation one has 0 ≤ E ≤ 1/3, the inconclusive rate, according to Eq. (17), can range here from 0 to 1, and can match a corresponding loss rate in the channel connecting the probe to the legitimate receiver. If the inconclusive rate R ? is chosen to match the loss rate in the channel connecting to the legitimate receiver, then the initial state of the probe must be tuned (using a polarizer located between the single-photon source and the target entrance port of the CNOT gate) to the value given by Eq.(21).
CONCLUSION
The conclusive entangling probe, which incorporates the POVM receiver to measure the quantum cryptographic entangling probe, is generalized to include a full range of inconclusive rates. It follows that the inconclusive rate of the POVM receiver can match any photon loss rate in the key distribution channel, and the standard BB84 and Ekert protocols of quantum key distribution then have vulnerabilities analogous to the well-known vulnerability of the standard B92 protocol.
